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Theory of Mind, empathy, and action observation are central themes in social neurosci-
ence research. Meta-analyses of functional neuroimaging studies show substantial het-
erogeneity in brain activation for these cognitive abilities, depending on the type of
experimental task used. We followed up on these findings by a comparison to basic con-
nectivity networks of the brain. In particular, we evaluated to what extent brain activation
for social cognition tasks draws on areas of different fMRI resting-state networks (e.g.,
Default Mode, Ventral Attention Network) in parallel. Our review illustrates high preva-
lence of such network co-recruitments across Theory of Mind, empathy, and action
observation tasks. To characterize these observations in more detail, we additionally
conducted a literature review of fMRI effective connectivity studies. Findings reveal two
main types of cross-network interactions in social cognition tasks: Negative coupling
(segregation) between Default Mode and Control Networks (Ventral Attention, Frontopar-
ietal, and Dorsal Attention Network), and positive coupling (integration) between these
networks. The two patterns reflect different types of brain network organization taking
place in the context of social cognition tasksesegregation for specialized, versus integra-
tion for flexible processing. We discuss evidence from connectivity research in other
research fields, suggesting that increased network integration indicates more effortful and
controlled processing. Based on that, we consider how findings of network segregation
versus integration can provide new perspectives on dual-system accounts of social
cognition, which differentiate between automatic and controlled processes. Moreover, we
discuss how the reviewed evidence relates to neural processes which are assumed to take
place during naturalistic social cognition.
© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).eh* Corresponding author. Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition, & Bom (M. Schurz).
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Successful social interactions require representing themental
states of others, such as their thoughts, emotions, and goals.
Over the last two decades, neuroimaging research has sought
to delineate how the brain enables such representations of
information about other minds. In particular, three topics
have been highly popular and subject of hundreds of pub-
lished neuroimaging studies. The first topic, often referred to
as Theory of Mind or mentalizing, covers research on how we
represent cognitive states of others, such as their thoughts
and beliefs (e.g., Adolphs, 2009; Kanske, 2018; Keysers &
Gazzola, 2009; Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Second, empathy
research has studied how more affective states of others are
represented (Gallese, 2003; Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2005;
Singer et al., 2004; Titchener, 1909). While both aforemen-
tioned topics feature representations of internal mental
states, a third research theme has focused on processes un-
derlying action observation and imitation (Buccino et al., 2004;
Grafton, Arbib, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Rizzolatti, Fadiga,
Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996). Some of these processes have been
linked to the “mirroring” of actions, which facilitates under-
standing of others' goals (e.g., Fabbri-Destro & Rizzolatti, 2008;
Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004).
Over recent years, neuroimaging meta-analyses have
increased our knowledge of these processes, and systemati-
cally investigated the consistency of brain activation across
different types of tasks used for studying Theory of Mind (e.g.,
Molenberghs, Johnson, Henry, & Mattingley, 2016; Schurz,
Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & Perner, 2014), empathy (e.g.,
Fan, Duncan, de Greck,&Northoff, 2011; Timmers et al., 2018),
and action observation (e.g., Hardwick, Caspers, Eickhoff, &
Swinnen, 2018; Molenberghs, Cunnington, & Mattingley,
2011). In particular for Theory of Mind and empathy, recent
meta-analyses show limited convergence of brain activity
across different task-types (e.g., Schurz et al., 2014; Timmers
et al., 2018).
High task-related heterogeneity in brain activation for so-
cial cognition tasks may be driven by different factors. Part of
this heterogeneity could reflect low-level stimulus and
instruction-related processes, which might be less interesting
for understanding social cognition (see e.g., Mar, 2011; Schurz
et al., 2014). On the other hand, component processes of social
cognition could be co-recruited in some tasks, and thus be
flexibly combined across domains (topics). To illustrate, we
observed that a subset of Theory of Mind tasks engage left
inferior frontal areas (Schurz et al., 2014), which overlap with
areas typically found in empathy and action observation
studies. Likewise, several authors have hypothesized that
Theory of Mind and empathy processes are engaged concur-
rently in some tasks, which they linked to concepts like
“Cognitive Empathy” (e.g., Hooker, Verosky, Germine, Knight,
& D'Esposito, 2010; Preston & de Waal, 2002; Shamay-Tsoory,
Aharon-Peretz, & Perry, 2009) and “Affective Theory of Mind”
(e.g., Mier et al., 2010a,b; Sebastian et al., 2012; Shamay-Tsoory
& Aharon-Peretz, 2007). Similarly, researchers have proposed
that action observation and empathy share common pro-
cesses (Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta, & Lenzi, 2003;
Gazzola, Aziz-Zadeh, & Keysers, 2006). Another type of socialcognition task, asking participants to inhibit the imitation of
an observed action (see Darda & Ramsey, 2019 for a meta-
analysis), has been thought to engage processes linked to
both action observation and Theory of Mind (e.g., Brass, Ruby,
& Spengler, 2009). As discussed by Happe, Cook, and Bird
(2017), processes engaged by different social cognition tasks
could be related in various forms. Tasks could broadly overlap
in terms of engaged processes, or engage some common and
some distinct processes. Alternatively, processes engaged by
one task could be a sub-set of those engaged by others.
Taken together, these points suggest that multiple and
functionally distinct component processes are combined by
some Theory of Mind, empathy, and action observation tasks.
The present review aims at delineating these functional pro-
cesses in terms of resting-state networks, which offer a task-
free demarcation of major networks of the brain and are
assumed to indicate different types of functional processing
(Cole, Ito, Bassett, & Schultz, 2016; Smith et al., 2009; Tavor
et al., 2016). This approach enables us to delineate different
types of processes implicated in social cognition tasks,
without the need of referring to the supposed outlines of
“Theory of Mind”, “empathy”, and “action observation” areas/
networks. As the connectivity pattern of an area determines
the inputs it receives and outputs that it can send, it is
considered as an important constraint of its function (see
Passingham, Stephan, & K€otter, 2002). Resting-state (e.g.,
Tavor et al., 2016) and diffusion-weighted (e.g., Osher et al.,
2016; Saygin et al., 2016) imaging studies showed that (task-
unrelated) connectivity patterns at individual voxels in the
brain carry enough information to predict whether they will
activate in certain experimental tasks. This predictive rela-
tionship has been found across a range of different cognitive
tasks (see Tavor et al., 2016).
Our approach is also motivated by previous research sug-
gesting overlap between areas of task activation and resting-
state networks for each of the three topics we consider.
Note, however, that resting-state networks cannot be linked
to specific forms of social cognition in a one-to-one fashion.
Rather, it has been argued that they reflect a history of co-
activation between brain regions during cognitive activity,
irrespective of cognitive domain (see e.g., Fair et al., 2007;Wig,
Schlaggar, & Petersen, 2011). Researchers have proposed that
social functions, in turn, are embedded into those resting-
state networks that support a set of cognitively related or
compatible processes (see e.g., Kanske, B€ockler, Trautwein, &
Singer, 2015). To illustrate, Theory of Mind tasks activate on
average most frequently around bilateral temporo-parietal
and anterior temporal cortex, medial prefrontal cortex, pos-
terior cingulate, and precuneus (e.g., Amodio & Frith, 2006;
Frith & Frith, 2006; Mitchell, 2009). These areas largely over-
lap with the so-called Default Mode Network (DMN), which is
assumed to mediate self-generated cognition decoupled from
the physical world (e.g., Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, &
Spreng, 2014). This function is compatible with processes
engaged during some Theory of Mind tasks, where we do not
have immediate perceptual access to others’ mental states
(see Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Bzdok et al., 2013; Frith & Frith,
2003; Lieberman, 2007; Mars et al., 2012a). Also for empathy
and action observation, overlaps between areas of task acti-
vation and resting-state networks have been noticed. Brain
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cortices, inferior frontal gyri, midcingulate cortex, supra-
marginal gyri, and somatosensory cortices (e.g., Bzdok et al.,
2012; Decety & Jackson, 2004; Kanske et al., 2015). Moreover,
as empathy produces an emotional response in the observer,
it also engages brain areas for emotion regulation (e.g.,
Kanske, Heissler, Sch€onfelder, Bongers, & Wessa, 2011;
Steinbeis, Bernhardt, & Singer, 2015), such as the dorsolat-
eral prefrontal cortex. These areas overlap with two resting-
state networks, the Ventral Attention Network (VAN) and
the Frontoparietal Network (FPN). In addition to functional
activation, structural variations in these two networks are
linked to empathy and Theory of Mind capacities as well (Valk
et al., 2017). Studies on action observation typically found
activation in bilateral fusiform, posterior temporal, parietal
and premotor/inferior frontal areas (e.g., Caspers, Zilles, Laird,
& Eickhoff, 2010; Hardwick et al., 2018; Molenberghs,
Cunnington, & Mattingley, 2009; Van Overwalle & Baetens,
2009), which overlap with parts of yet another resting-state
network, the Dorsal Attention Network (DAN). In the present
review, we follow up on these previous observations by a
systematic and quantitative assessment of overlaps.
While the first part of our review is assessing whether
multiple distinct networks are engaged by individual social
cognition tasks, we next review how these networks interact.
Therefore, the second part of our review gives an overview of
task-based connectivity studies on social cognition that
analyzed cross-network interactions. In particular, we seek to
characterize which networks tends to drive interactions, i.e.,
are “orchestrating” information exchange. We thus focus our
review on studies of effective connectivity, which give results
on direction and sign of interactions. In other words, we re-
view how networks implicated in social cognition are influ-
encing each other's activity, and if interactions are positive
(i.e., excitatory) or negative (i.e., inhibitory).2. First part: characterizing network co-
activations by comparing meta-analyses to
resting-state networks
2.1. Methods
We carried out conjunction analyses to calculate overlaps
between meta-analysis and resting-state connectivity maps.2
For resting-state maps, we used the MNI-space version (“lib-
eral mask”) of the seven network parcellation by Yeo et al.
(2011). Meta-analysis maps were also given in MNI space. For
one meta-analysis (Schurz et al., 2014), we re-analyzed data
with a more recent software version (AES-SDM 4.31, Radua
et al., 2012; www.sdmproject.com). This was done to obtain
result maps in MNI space (while Schurz et al., 2014 originally
reported results in Talairach space). To adjust images in terms2 Meta-analysis maps report areas which are consistently
activated for a certain task type. For simplicity and brevity, we
refer to these maps as “task-activation maps”. However, techni-
cally, most meta-analytic maps covered in this review indicate
the strength of convergence across studies, rather than the
strength of underlying brain activation.of size and resolution, we ran a simple SPM reslice job for all
meta-analysis maps, using Yeo et al.'s (2011) maps as image
defining space. This was carried out with SPM12 (www.fil.ion.
ucl.ac.uk/spm). Finally, as the Yeo et al. (2011) parcellation
covers only cortical but no sub-cortical areas, we restricted
(masked) all meta-analysismaps to these cortical areas for the
calculation of overlaps.
For quantifying overlaps, we used a variant of the dice
score: For each meta-analysis map, we determined the per-
centage of voxels falling within each different intrinsic con-
nectivity network of the Yeo et al. (2011) parcellation.
Therefore, with i1 being a meta-analysis map and i2 an
intrinsic connectivity network, we calculated (n voxels in
i1&i2)/(n voxels in i1). By calculating percentages scaled to the
total number of voxels comprising each meta-analysis, we
aimed at using a comparable metric despite meta-analyses
being different in overall size and voxel extent (as they were
carried out using different methods and statistical thresh-
olding). For all meta-analyses in our review, we showmaps at
the same thresholds as used in the original studies. Bar charts
in Figs. 1e3 summarize the percentage scores.
For display purposes, we projected meta-analysis maps as
well as outlines of the Yeo et al. (2011) seven network par-
cellation to a cortical surface. All maps were projected to the
Human Connectome Project (HCP) group average template
“HCP_S1200_inflated_MSMAll”, using the volume-to-surface
function in wb_command (www.humanconnectome.org).
Note that, for the sake of coherence among surfaces, we also
projected an MNI-space version of Yeo et al.'s (2011) parcel-
lation (“liberal mask”, https://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/
fswiki/CorticalParcellation_Yeo2011) to the HCP surface
using the volume-to-surface function. While surfaces are
presented for illustrative purposes, we refer to the bar charts
in Figs. 1e3 for quantitative assessments of overlap (which are
based on calculations in MNI volume space).
2.2. Tasks in our review
2.2.1. Theory of Mind
For Theory of Mind (see Fig. 1), we cover meta-analyses of a
pooled sample and four individual task groups from Schurz
et al. (2014). Among the task groups, False Belief tasks pre-
sented verbal stories about characters holding mistaken be-
liefs. Trait Judgment tasks presented personality trait words
and asked participants to judge if they applied to a certain
person (e.g., a celebrity). Both tasks groups show predominant
activation in medial prefrontal cortex, precuneus, and bilat-
eral temporo-parietal cortexeareas which have been
frequently mentioned in reviews of Theory of Mind task-
activation (e.g., Frith & Frith, 2003; Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013;
Mitchell, 2009; Murray, Schaer, & Debbane, 2012; Van Over-
walle, 2009).
Furthermore, we included two task groups from the same
meta-analysis for which we also found activation in fronto-
temporal areaseSocial Animations and Reading the Mind in
the Eyes tasks. Tasks from the former group showed anima-
tions of simple geometric shapes moving in a way which
resembled intentional or social interactions. Tasks from the
latter group presented photographs of eye-regions of faces
and asked participants which mental-state word best
Fig. 1 eMeta-analysis maps displayed on the cortical surface, along with the borders of the Yeo 7 Network parcellation (Yeo
et al., 2011). We showmeta-analysis maps for a pooled Theory of Mind sample (All tasks), and task groups False Belief, Trait
Judgments, Social Animations, and Reading the Mind in the Eyes (Schurz et al., 2014). Bar charts show the percentage of
voxels from each meta-analysis map which fall into different intrinsic connectivity networks. Networks: VIS, Visual
Network; SOM, Somatomotor Network; DAN, Dorsal Attention Network; VAN, Ventral Attention Network; LIM, Limbic
Network; FPN, Frontoparietal Network; DMN, Default Mode Network.
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observing activation in inferior frontal areas for both tasks, we
have suggested (Schurz et al., 2014) that the Theory of Mind
network receives support from areas linked to action obser-
vation and mirroring in these contexts. Moreover, perfor-
mance on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task was found to
be related more strongly to individual differences in alex-
ithymia than autism spectrum disorder (Oakley, Brewer, Bird,
& Catmur, 2016), which suggests that it measures emotion
recognition ability, in addition to (or even rather than) ToM
abilities. Besides the four Theory of Mind task groups shown
in Fig. 1, we show overlaps for further task groups3 from the3 These additional two meta-analyses show highly similar
patterns of overlap as found for False Belief and Trait Judgment
tasks, which is why we do not present them in the main text for
sake of brevity.meta-analysis by Schurz et al. (2014) in Supplementary
Figure 1.
2.2.2. Empathy
In Fig. 2, we show a pooledmeta-analysis of empathy and four
maps from different empathy task categories (Timmers et al.,
2018). The authors split the empathy meta-analysis according
to two orthogonal factors. First, the sample was divided into
Cognitive/Evaluative tasks (e.g., ratings of pain or emotional
states in other persons) versus Perceptual/Affective tasks (i.e.,
no task instructions, passive observation of others’ emotional
states). Second, it was distinguished between Pain tasks (i.e.,
presenting pain stimuli, such as displays of painful stimula-
tion or painful facial expressions) and Non-Pain Negative
Affect tasks (e.g., presenting displays of facial expressions or
emotional scenes). Among these subgroups, we expect in
particular Cognitive/Evaluative Empathy tasks to activate
Fig. 2 eMeta-analysis maps displayed on the cortical surface, along with the borders of the Yeo 7 Network parcellation (Yeo
et al., 2011). For empathy, maps from the meta-analysis by Timmers et al. (2018) are shown separately for a pooled meta-
analysis (All tasks), and the task categories Pain, Non-Pain Negative Affect, Cognitive/Evaluative, and Perceptual/Affective.
Bar charts show the percentage of voxels from each meta-analysis map which fall into different intrinsic connectivity
networks. Networks: VIS, Visual Network; SOM, Somatomotor Network; DAN, Dorsal Attention Network; VAN, Ventral
Attention Network; LIM, Limbic Network; FPN, Frontoparietal Network; DMN, Default Mode Network.
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Several researchers have linked more cognitive forms of
empathy to Theory of Mind processes (e.g., Dziobek et al.,
2011; Hooker, Verosky, Germine, Knight, & D’Esposito, 2010;
Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009). Besides the contrasts shown in
Fig. 2, additional contrasts carried out by Timmers et al. (2018)
are shown in Supplementary Figure 1.
2.2.3. Action observation
For action observation (see Fig. 3), we included the meta-
analyses of a pooled sample and three individual task
groupseArm, Leg, and Face Movement Observation tasks
(Hardwick et al., 2018). All task groups contained passive
paradigms, in which participants were asked to merely
observe presented movement. Whereas Arm and Leg
Movement Observation tasks tapped more strongly into
processing of purely motor-related information, part of theFace Movement Observation tasks also contained emotional
content conveyed by facial expressions. This links the latter
task group to empathy; also in the empathy meta-analyses
included in our review, a fraction of tasks presented pain-
ful or emotional facial expressions.
2.3. Findings
As shown in Figs. 1e3, only a small number of task activation
maps showed clear preference for a single intrinsic connec-
tivity network in terms of overlap. The most noticeable ex-
amples for this patternwere found in the Theory of Mind field,
namely False Belief and Trait Judgment tasks. To illustrate,
around 80% of brain regions engaged for Trait Judgments fell
within the Default Mode Network. All the other network-
overlaps comprised less than 10% of that task activation
map. For the topics empathy and action observation, task
Fig. 3 eMeta-analysis maps displayed on the cortical surface, along with the borders of the Yeo 7 Network parcellation (Yeo
et al., 2011). For action observation, we show meta-analysis maps for a pooled sample (All tasks), as well as Arm, Leg, and
Face Movement Observation tasks individually (Hardwick et al., 2018). Bar charts show the percentage of voxels from each
meta-analysis map which fall into different intrinsic connectivity networks. Networks: VIS, Visual Network; SOM,
Somatomotor Network; DAN, Dorsal Attention Network; VAN, Ventral Attention Network; LIM, Limbic Network; FPN,
Frontoparietal Network; DMN, Default Mode Network.
c o r t e x 1 3 0 ( 2 0 2 0 ) 1 4 2e1 5 7 147groups showed less strong preferences in overlap. Highest
overlaps were found for the tasks Empathy for Pain (Ventral
Attention Network) and Observing Arm Movement (Dorsal
Attention Network), respectively. However, in both cases,
networks of highest overlap only contained about half of task-
active areas (53% and 43%, respectively).
More distributed patternswere found for a number of tasks
for each of the three topics. Among these, some tasks showed
slightly preferential overlap with one network, but a compa-
rable amount of overlap with the two next best overlapping
networks. For example, for Social Animations (Theory of
Mind), 39% of task-activation overlapped with the Default
Mode Network, and 36% overlapped with the Ventral Atten-
tion and the Somatomotor Networks taken together. Similar
patterns of overlap across three networks were found for the
pooled meta-analyses (across all tasks) for empathy and ac-
tion observation, as well as the task Observing Leg Movement.
Moreover, a number of tasks showed even more broadlydistributed network overlap. Here, the highest amounts of
overlap were not only found in a single, but at least in two
different networks. This was the case, for example, for the
Reading the Mind in the Eyes task from the Theory of Mind
field (32% Default Mode and 28% Ventral Attention Network).
Similar patterns were found for Perceptual Empathy and Face
Movement Observation tasks.3. Second part: effective connectivity
findings on cross-network interactions
To follow up on our observations of joint engagement of
multiple socially-relevant connectivity networks, we carried
out a literature review on connectivity studies. We focused on
studies reporting effective (i.e., directed) connectivity findings
between areas from different socially-relevant networks. All
studies we cover in this review relied on Dynamic Causal
4 Note that in a DCM analysis, positive coupling parameters
indicate that an increase in area A is associated with an increase
in area B, which we will refer to as excitatory (for simplicity).
Negative coupling parameters indicate that an increase in area A
is associated with a decrease in area B, and thus an inhibitory
relationship.
5 Note that the medial prefrontal area in the DCM study by
Regenbogen et al. (2013) was actually located at the border of the
FPN and DMN.
c o r t e x 1 3 0 ( 2 0 2 0 ) 1 4 2e1 5 7148Modeling (DCM, Friston, Harrison, & Penny, 2003) to estimate
effective connectivity.
3.1. Methods
To identify studies reporting cross-network connectivity in
the context of social tasks, we conducted a systematic litera-
ture search using PubMed and Web of Science databases in
June and July of 2019. We conducted the following key word
searches: First (‘empathy’ AND/OR ‘Theory of Mind’) AND
(‘dcm’ OR ‘granger causality modeling’), yielding 12 and 14
search items. In addition (‘empathy’ AND/OR ‘Theory of
Mind’) AND (‘effective connectivity’), yielding 335 and 52
search items. Due to our focused research question, we
excluded a large part of retrieved studies (see exclusion
criteria below). Further literature was found by forward and
backward searches within reference lists of most recent and
relevant studies found in our database search (yielding 14
additional items).
We limited our sample to studies applying methods of
effective connectivity on fMRI data in healthy adult subjects,
and presenting tasks which explicitly measured empathy
(e.g., participants were asked to empathize with a person in a
video clip) or Theory of Mind (e.g., participants were asked to
identify what a person in a video clip was thinking about).
These selection criteria excluded, for example, studies in
which participants were merely observing emotional expres-
sions, or were asked to label facial affect (e.g., Arioli et al.,
2018; Torrisi, Lieberman, Bookheimer, & Altshuler, 2013). We
furthermore excluded studies that focused on empathy-
related features of spoken language (i.e., affective prosody, see
Ethofer et al., 2006).
Because of our specific interest in cross-network in-
teractions, we additionally excluded studies analyzing con-
nectivity only for areas of one canonical resting-state network
linked to social cognition (i.e., all areas falling either within
the Default Mode, Ventral Attention, Frontoparietal, or Dorsal
Attention Network). Similarly, we excluded studies analyzing
connectivity only for one resting-state network linked to so-
cial cognition, and only low-level areas besides (Hillebrandt,
Friston, & Blakemore, 2014; Pehrs et al., 2017). As the resting-
state parcellation by Yeo et al. (2011) does not cover subcor-
tical areas, we also excluded connectivity analyses that cen-
trally feature corticalesubcortical interactions (e.g.,
amygdala: Bruneau, Jacoby, & Saxe, 2015; hippocampus:
Pehrs, Zaki, Taruffi, Kuchinke, & Koelsch, 2018; cerebellum:
Van Overwalle, Van de Steen, & Mari€en, 2019). Moreover, as
we were interested in directed connectivity, we excluded
studies applying Psycho-Physiological Interaction (PPI) anal-
ysis to assess connectivity, as this method does not provide
information about the direction of an interaction (e.g., Lamm,
Meltzoff, & Decety, 2010; Zaki, Ochsner, Hanelin, Wager, &
Mackey, 2007).
Seven studies matched all our selection criteria. In the
following, we will give a short overview of these studies and
their findings. Note that if studies reported effective connec-
tivity for multiple conditions and modulatory effects, we
report only the effect best reflecting a change in (cognitive or
affective) mental state related contents. For example, the
study by Regenbogen, Habel, and Kellermann (2013) reportedone main effect of emotional information, three different
additional effects of incongruence between emotional chan-
nels, and one effect of incomprehensible speech. For
simplicity, we only illustrate connectivity patterns related to
themain effect of emotional information in Fig. 4 butmention
the other conditions alongside.
3.2. Findings
Fig. 4 illustrates modulatory effects on cross-network con-
nectivity found for social conditions in our reviewed studies.
We organize these results by networks driving the in-
teractions. In terms of signals originating from the Default
Mode Network (DMN), two studies found top-down influences
by medial prefrontal areas onto areas of the Ventral Attention
Network (VAN) and Dorsal Attention Network (DAN). In
particular, a False Belief reasoning study (Schuwerk et al.,
2014) reported negative coupling, that is, inhibitory influ-
ence,4 whereas a perspective taking study (Hillebrandt,
Dumontheil, Blakemore, & Roiser, 2013) found positive
coupling, that is, excitatory influence. In terms of signals
driven by areas of the VAN, a social attentional reorienting
task (Schuwerk, Schurz, Mu¨ller, Rupprecht, & Sommer, 2017)
reported positive bottom-up signalling from a posterior
medial temporal area (sometimes referred to as TPJ anterior,
e.g., Bzdok et al., 2013; Mars et al., 2012b) to the anterior
cingulate cortex in the DMN.
Finally, two patterns of interactions were found for the
Frontoparietal Network (FPN). Two studies from the empathy
field (Kanske, B€ockler, Trautwein, Parianen Lesemann, &
Singer, 2016; Regenbogen et al., 2013) found negative sig-
nalling from frontal (mPFC, insula) areas of the FPN,5 exerted
onto temporo-parietal areas of the DMN. Both of these
studies used tasks in which participants were asked to pro-
cess feelings (and thoughts) of persons presented via video.
By contrast, a study (Tettamanti et al., 2017) on mentalizing
based on linguistic input (i.e., inferring the intention
conveyed by a person's utterances or gestures) found left and
right inferior frontal areas within the FPN to drive activation
in DMN areas. Similarly, Van Ackeren, Smaragdi, and
Rueschemeyer (2016) asked participants to infer speaker's
intentions (indirect speech) and found an inferior frontal
area to have a positive influence on DMN areas. Note, how-
ever, that in that study, the inferior frontal area was falling
into the VAN rather than the FPN.4. Discussion
In this review, we compared meta-analyses on three promi-
nent topics in social cognition researcheTheory of Mind,
Fig. 4 e Cross-network connectivity in social tasks. Arrows indicate direction of signalling, red lines indicate positive
(excitatory), blue lines negative (inhibitory) modulation of coupling. Abbreviations: INS, Insula; mPFC, medial Prefrontal
Cortex; ACC, Anterior Cingulate Cortex; IFG, Inferior Frontal Gyrus; TPJ, Temporoparietal Junction; MTG, Middle Temporal
Gyrus; STG/STS, Superior Temporal Gyrus/Sulcus; AG, Angular Gyrus; IPL, Inferior Parietal Lobule; SOG, Superior Occipital
Gyrus; V1, Area V1; PREC, Precuneus; AC, Auditory Cortex; FFG, Fusiform Gyrus; p/post, posterior.
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brain activation for different tasks probing these cognitive
abilities engages only one or several more basic (resting-state)
networks of the brain. In addition, we reviewed findings of
effective connectivity studies to sort out how areas from
different networks interact during social cognition tasks. Our
main hypothesis was that a part of Theory of Mind, empathy,
and action observation tasks co-recruit multiple functionally
distinct processes and corresponding brain networks.
4.1. Co-activation of multiple networks implicated in
social cognition
In the first part of our manuscript we reviewed the overlap
between resting-state networks and areas of task activation
found in meta-analyses of Theory of Mind, empathy, and ac-
tion observation. Coherence among these two types of neu-
roimaging evidence varied considerably. For some tasks, in
particular from the Theory of Mind field, activation maps
showed strong correspondencewith a single network (e.g., the
Default Mode Network). For other cases, however, task acti-
vation was distributed across multiple different networks. For
all three topics, we found tasks for which activation over-
lapped both with the Default Mode and the Ventral Attention
Network. Among themwere, for example, Reading theMind in
the Eyes tasks (Theory of Mind), Cognitive/Evaluative
Empathy tasks, and Face Movement Observation tasks (action
observation).
The fact thatwe found strong variability in correspondence
between resting-state networks and meta-analytic maps also
supports the soundness of our analysis approach. Meta-
analytic maps are spatially smooth in nature. In principle,
this could lead to generally diffuse overlap, that is, all task-
activation networks falling into multiple distinct resting-
state networks (because of high spatial smoothness of the
former). We observed a different pattern of results. To illus-
trate, one Theory of Mind task (Trait Judgments) had an
overlap of 80% with one network, compared to only 7% with
the next best matching network. In contrast, for another
Theory of Mind task (Reading the Mind in the Eyes), we found
overlap values of 32% and 28% for this comparison. Both of
these task-maps were created with the same meta-analysis
method and identical smoothing (see Radua et al., 2012 for
methods). This speaks against the concern that distributed
patterns of overlap are only a consequence of strong meta-
analytic smoothing. Note also that at least equally strong
smoothing was applied for the meta-analyses we mentioned
(Schurz et al., 2014), and the other meta-analyses covered in
this review (Hardwick et al., 2018; Timmers et al., 2018; see
Eickhoff et al., 2009 for methods).
4.2. Cross-network interactions
Given the co-activations of different networks we have
reviewed, an outstanding question is whether and how these
networks interact with each other. In the second part of our
review, we summarized effective connectivity studies
analyzing cross-network interactions. We organize our dis-
cussion of these findings along a prominent theme in network
neuroscienceeinteractions between the Default Mode and“Control Networks” (e.g., Cole, Repovs, & Anticevic, 2014;
Dosenbach, Fair, Cohen, Schlaggar, & Petersen, 2008). The
latter term subsumes three important networks for this re-
view, the Ventral Attention, Dorsal Attention, and the Fron-
toparietal Network.
4.2.1. Negative coupling (segregation) between Default Mode
and Control Networks
Awell-documented finding of cross-network interaction is the
inhibitory and competitive relationship between the Default
Mode Network and Control Networks. The Default Mode
Network has been found to decrease its activity during tasks
that require externally focused attention (e.g., Mazoyer et al.,
2001; Raichle et al., 2001; Shulman et al., 1997). Moreover,
studies found an inhibitory relationship between the Ventral
Attention and the Default Mode Network, which has been
considered to reflect the former down-regulating the latter to
reduce interference from task-unrelated processes (Goulden
et al., 2014; Wen, Liu, Yao, & Ding, 2013; Trautwein, Singer,
& Kanske, 2016; see also Anticevic et al., 2012). At passive
rest, Default Mode and Ventral Attention Networks have been
found unrelated (e.g., Alcala-Lopez et al., 2018) and sometimes
anti-correlated in terms of activity (Bzdok et al., 2013; Chai,
Casta~non, €Ongu¨r, & Whitfield-Gabrieli, 2012; Fox et al., 2005;
Zhou et al., 2018). In a task-based fMRI study, Trautwein et al.
(2016) analyzed functional connectivity for a combined
stimulus-driven reorienting and executive control paradigm.
The authors could show that both attentional control pro-
cesses, which are linked to distinct control networks in the
brain, have a similar down-regulating effect on the Default
Mode Network.
Consistent with these findings of inhibitory interactions,
our review of effective connectivity studies found negative
signalling from the Frontoparietal to the Default Mode
Network. Two studies presenting affective contents (Kanske
et al., 2016; Regenbogen et al., 2013) found a negative signal
from frontal (mPFC, insula) areas of the Frontoparietal
Network, exerted onto temporo-parietal areas of the Default
Mode Network. A commonality of these studies is that they
presented videos of persons telling emotional autobiograph-
ical stories. Kanske et al. (2016) suggested that the negative
coupling could reflect that affective processes (i.e., empa-
thizing) are taking precedence relative to mentalizing. Auto-
biographical stories are rich and naturalistic stimuli, which
provide grounds for both empathizing and mentalizing.
Therefore, inhibition of Default Mode Network activation
could reflect focusing of attention on those aspects of the
social input that potentially require the most immediate ac-
tion (see Menon & Uddin, 2010).
Besides, we found another pattern of negative coupling in a
belief-reasoning study by Schuwerk et al. (2014). Participants
viewed a false-belief cartoon animation (about object location)
and were asked to make own-belief and other-belief judg-
ments. For this task, the authors found a negative top-down
signal from the medial prefrontal cortex (Default Mode
Network) to posterior temporal areas (at the border between
Ventral/Dorsal Attention Networks). Although the literature
has reported inhibitory influences in this direction less
frequently, some theoretical accounts are in line with such a
pattern. Researchers have hypothesized that posterior parts of
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for Theory of Mind (e.g., Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Frith & Frith,
2003; see also; Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004; Rothmayer
et al., 2011; D€ohnel et al., 2012; Sommer et al., 2007). This
process is thought to separate belief representations from
representations of reality. Based on this idea, inhibitory sig-
nals from the posterior medial prefrontal cortex (i.e., the
Default Mode Network)may down-regulate bottom-up signals
from the Ventral Attention Network, which convey new in-
formation about ongoing external events. For example, for
maintaining a representation of another person's belief, novel
incoming information about how reality changes needs to be
separated.
Consistent with the notion of segregation, behavioral and
patient studies also found some Theory of Mind (i.e., Default
Mode) and empathy (i.e., Ventral Attention) related processes
to be largely independent (Reiter, Kanske, Eppinger,& Li, 2017;
Stietz, Jauk, Krach, & Kanske, 2019; Winter, Spengler,
Bermpohl, Singer, & Kanske, 2017). In the “EmpaToM” task,
Kanske et al. (2016) used a combined task framework that
behaviourally measured Theory of Mind (accuracy and speed
in inferring other's beliefs) and empathy (emotional valence
ratings) in a large group of healthy adults (see also Kanske
et al., 2015). The two measures were uncorrelated. In a
further analysis that combined Theory of Mind and empathy
measures from additional tasks, the authors found no corre-
lation either. Also, studies that tested more cognitive (Strange
Stories) versus more affective (Reading the Mind in the Eyes)
measures of Theory of Mind found no correlation between
them (Dziobek et al., 2006; Rice, Moraczewski,& Redcay, 2016).
Furthermore, studies in brain damaged patients found a
double-dissociation between cognitive and affective forms of
Theory of Mind (Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007; see
also Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009).
4.2.2. Positive coupling (integration) between Default Mode
and Control Networks
Functional networks and their interactions are constrained by
underlying structural brain connectivity (e.g., Bullmore &
Sporns, 2009; Honey et al., 2009). Therefore, classic findings
of segregation between Default Mode and Control Networks
presumably reflect a predominant pattern of network inter-
action over time. Nevertheless, recent studies have pointed
out another pattern of cross-network interaction, which takes
place during particular cognitive states. For cognitively
demanding tasks, large scale networks of the brain have
shown to increase their integration (i.e., form positive asso-
ciations). A prominent example are increases in global
network integration for higher-levels of N-back working
memory tasks (e.g., Shine et al., 2016; Vatansever, Menon,
Manktelow, Sahakian, & Stamatakis, 2015; Wendelken,
Ferrer, Whitaker, & Bunge, 2016). Shine et al. (2016) could
further show that network integration increases across a va-
riety of other cognitive tasks (compared to passive rest). In
that study, a Theory of Mind task (Social Animations) and an
N-Back workingmemory task showed the highest integration.
Researchers hypothesized that high network integration re-
flects a response to task complexity, characterized by goal-
directedness and cognitive control (for a review, see Shine &
Poldrack, 2018).Concerning network integration, it is interesting to note
that the Default Mode Network mainly consists of richly
connected network “hubs” (Barbey et al., 2018; Gu et al., 2015).
For example, the precuneus and posterior cingulate cortex are
thought to build a structural “core” of the brain, and to have
the highest number of connections with other areas/networks
of the brain (Hagmann et al., 2008; Van den Heuvel & Sporns,
2013). Based on a comprehensive analysis of brain structure,
functional connectivity, and large-scale meta-analytic acti-
vation, Margulies et al. (2016) argued that the far-reaching
pattern of connectivity of the Default Mode Network enables
to establish highly multimodal and abstract representations.
Somewhat relatedly, the “global workspace”model posits that
the Default Mode Network provides a hub for generating
highly associative representations (e.g., Dehaene& Changeux,
2011; Vatansever et al., 2015).
In this light, several positive cross-network interactions
identified in our review are of interest. Tettamanti et al. (2017)
as well as Van Ackeren et al. (2016) asked participants to infer
others' mental states based on linguistic information (i.e.,
inferring intentions conveyed by a person's utterances). Both
studies found that the left inferior frontal gyrus (as part of
Frontoparietal Network/Ventral Attention Networks) drives
activation in areas of the Default Mode Network. This pattern
is compatible with the idea that areas of the Default Mode
Network integrate information for generating abstract repre-
sentations: Language processing areas parse linguistic input
and then forward that information to the Default Mode
Network for subsequent analysis (e.g., mentalizing). Notably,
Tettamanti et al., 2017 additionally reported negative signal-
ling from the right inferior frontal gyrus (Dorsal Attention
Network) to multiple Default Mode Network areas. This
pattern was found for a second experimental condition, in
which participants were asked to infer intentions from ges-
tures, rather than speech. However, due to the way the DCM
analysis was set up in that study (i.e., specification of re-
gressors), these negative coupling values indicated reduced
coupling for speech versus gesture conditions. In other words,
coupling was relatively stronger (less negative) during the
gesture condition. Based on the notion of the Default Mode
Network as an information integrator, we speculate that this
could reflect that right inferior frontal areas are implicated in
parsing non-verbal gestural information, and then send the
results to Default Mode areas for further analysis. Several
functional connectivity studies based on Psycho-Physiological
Interaction (PPI) analysis support a similar interpretation. In
various settings, participants were asked to infer others' in-
tentions or beliefs from their actions. Themain result of those
studies was that connectivity between Default Mode Network
(medial prefrontal and temporo-parietal cortex) and fronto-
parietal action observation areas was increased (Ciaramidaro,
Becchio, Colle, Bara, & Walter, 2014; Sperduti, Guionnet,
Fossati, & Nadel, 2014; Spunt & Lieberman, 2012a,b; Thioux,
Suttrup, & Keysers, 2018; see also Schippers, Gazzola,
Goebel, & Keysers, 2009; Schippers, Roebroeck, Renken,
Nanetti, & Keysers, 2010).
Besides studies that found influence from inferior frontal
areas on the Default Mode Network, our review also contained
one study (Schuwerk et al., 2017) which found bottom-up
signalling from the posterior middle temporal gyrus (Ventral
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Mode Network). Here, participants performed an attention-
reorienting task in a social context, i.e., they were told that
attention cues signal another person's expectation (belief)
about where the target will appear. Again, this finding is
compatible with the idea that the Default Mode Network in-
tegrates information from other networks. Specifically, pos-
terior temporal areas may be involved in processing
information about a social context and forward the output to
the Default Mode Network for further processing. Another
study in our review, however, shows a less coherent result
pattern. Hillebrandt et al. (2013) found a positive top-down
signal from a Default Mode Network area (anterior cingulate
cortex) to posterior temporal and visual areas that are part of
the Dorsal Attention and Visual Networks. This finding goes in
the opposite direction compared to previous ones, suggesting
that the Default Mode Network is the source of signals, rather
than receiving them. Hillebrandt et al. (2013) suggested that
their results could reflect Default Mode Network areas inhib-
iting low-level visual representations by regulating activation
in the area. While such an interpretation is consistent with
negative coupling as discussed in the preceding section
(rather than global integration), further evidence is necessary
to disambiguate findings.
4.3. Summary and outlook
We have reviewed how task-activation for social cognition
studies maps onto basic connectivity networks of the brain.
Correspondencewas found at varying degrees. For some tasks,
we found high overlap with a single connectivity network. For
other tasks, widely distributed patterns of overlap were found,
which indicates that they engage functionally distinct net-
works in parallel. To characterize how areas from these
different networks interact with another, we reviewed effec-
tive connectivity studies on social cognition. Findings show
two types of cross-network interactions: Negative coupling
(i.e., segregation) and positive coupling (integration) between
different networks. Finding both segregation and integration
among networks does not imply a contradiction, but rather
reflects two rivalling constraints on cognitive function (e.g.,
Shine & Poldrack, 2018). While segregation enables functional
specialization, integration enables neural flexibility. In terms
of cognitive processing, it has been hypothesized that network
integration reflects more controlled and effortful processing
(e.g., Kitzbichler, Henson, Smith, Nathan, & Bullmore, 2011;
Shine & Poldrack, 2018; Vatansever et al., 2015). This relation-
ship could help to characterize social cognitive tasks. Re-
searchers have hypothesized that one fundamental difference
among cognitive components of social cognition (e.g., Apperly
& Butterfill, 2009; Happe et al., 2017) is whether they are effi-
cient and automatic versus effortful and controlled. Interest-
ingly, however, several neuroimaging studies reported
common areas activated for automatic versus controlled tasks.
For example, researchers observed that “implicit” (i.e. simple,
uninstructed and requiring little control) and “explicit” Theory
of Mind tasks recruit overlapping brain areas (e.g., Bardi,
Desmet, Nijhof, Wiersema, & Brass, 2016; Bardi, Six, & Brass,
2017; Boccadoro et al., 2019; Naughtin et al., 2017; Nijhof,
Bardi, Brass, & Wiersema, 2018; see also; Van Overwalle &Vandekerckhove, 2013). Looking at patterns of network inte-
gration in such studies could further specify how the same
brain areas may implement more effortful versus more auto-
matic mentalizing via different patterns of network
interactions.
Finally, the reviewed evidence on cross-network integra-
tionmay highlight mechanisms relevant for more naturalistic
(and complex) forms of social cognition. Studies presenting
more vivid social stimuli, such as scenes or videos of social
interactions (e.g., Deuse et al., 2016; Wolf, Dziobek, &
Heekeren, 2010), found areas linked to Theory of Mind and
empathy to be jointly activated. Moreover, co-activation of
areas linked to Theory of Mind and action observation has
been found during interpersonal interactions (see Schilbach
et al., 2013), which undoubtedly play a central role in
everyday social life. For example, in an fMRI study, Schilbach,
Eickhoff, Mojzisch, and Vogeley (2008) measured social in-
teractions in terms of brain activity related to facial mimicry.
Results showed brain activation in the precuneus and other
medial areas on the one hand, and premotor areas such as the
precentral gyrus on the other hand. In another seminal study,
Zaki, Weber, Bolger, and Ochsner (2009) asked participants to
watch videos of people who were telling stories about auto-
biographical events. Participantswere also asked to judge how
the person in the video felt. Besides, the narrators in the video
themselves reported their mood during story-telling. Partici-
pants were considered accurate in their empathic judgment if
their judgment was close to the narrator's self-report. During
moment of high accuracy, participants' brain activity was high
both in areas linked to Theory of Mind (e.g., medial prefrontal
cortex) and action observation (e.g., premotor cortex). Taken
together, these studies once again highlight the idea that so-
cial abilities are not only characterized by activation levels of
isolated networks, but also by the level of information inte-
gration between them.Declaration of Competing Interest
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